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Recent Developments 
Dupree v. State: 
The Prosecution May Not Impeach a Defendant with Evidence of the Defendant's 
Silence Following Advisement of Miranda Rights 
I n a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a trial court may not admit 
testimony that a defendant was 
advised of his Miranda rights and 
thereafter remained silent for purposes 
of impeachment. Dupree v. State, 
352 Md. 314,722 A.2d 52 (1998). 
In so holding, the court preserved the 
right of a defendant to remain silent 
without evidence of this fact being 
used against him. 
This case arose from an incident 
on May 3, 1996, when Sean Dupree 
("Dupree") shot and killed a man 
following a brief confrontation on the 
street. Id. at 316, 722 A.2d at 53. 
Dupree was arrested and charged in 
connection with the incident. Id at 
321, 722A.2dat55. Upon his arrest, 
Dupree chose to remain silent after he 
was advised of his Miranda rights. Id 
at 322, 722 A.2d at 55. 
In the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, Dupree was found 
guilty of second degree murder and 
use of a handgun in the commission 
of a crime of violence. At Dupree's 
trial, the court allowed the 
prosecution, for the purpose of 
impeachment, to introduce testimony 
that Dupree was advised of his 
Miranda rights. Id at 321, 722 A.2d 
at 55. Dupree appealed the decision 
to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed the 
conviction. Id Dupree petitioned the 
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Court of Appeals of Maryland, which 
granted certiorari. Id. at 316, 722 
A.2d at 53. Dupree contended that 
the prosecution's offered testimony 
violated both Maryland evidentiary 
rules and his constitutional rights, 
stressing thatthe testimony allowed the 
jury to infer impermissibly an 
admission of guilt. Id. at 322, 722 
A.2d at 55. 
In addressing the issue of 
whether the trial judge erred in 
admitting this evidence, the court first 
reviewed State v. Raithel, in which a 
similar issue was decided twenty 
years ago. Id at 323, 722 A.2d at 
56 (citing State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 
478, 404 A.2d 264 (1979)). In 
Raithel, the court of special appeals 
held that the "privilege against self-
incrimination prevents an accused's 
silence ~t a prior hearing from being 
considered in assessing his credibility," 
a ruling the court of appeals affinned 
on appeal without having to reach the 
constitutional issue. Id (citing Raithel 
at 478,404 A.2d at 267). 
The court observed that the initial 
consideration in admitting the evidence 
in the instant case was whether the 
evidence was proper under the 
applicable state law. Id. Under the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence 5-401 
and 5-402, the trial court may not 
admit evidence of any fact that is not 
relevant to the determination of guilt 
or innocence in a criminal trial. Id. at 
323-34, 722 A.2d at 56 (citing MD. 
R. EVID. 5-401 and 5-402). The 
court noted that, although the trial 
judge has the ultimate discretion under 
the rules to review and admit 
evidence, the judge may not abuse 
that discretion. Id. at 324,722 A.2d 
at 56 (citing Merzbacher v. State, 
346 Md. 391,404,697 A.2d 432, 
439 (1997)). The court concluded 
that the judge in Dupree abused his/ 
her discretion by admitting evidence 
that was not relevant to any issue in 
the case. Id at 332, 722 A.2d at 
61. 
The court reasoned that, 
because Dupree's silence was not 
material to any fact at issue in the 
case, testimony that he was advised 
of his rights was inadmissable. Id at 
332, 722 A.2d at 61. Such 
testimony, the court speculated, 
allowed the prosecution to indirectly 
suggest to the jury that the defendant 
chose to remain silent because he had 
something to hide. Id. at 322, 722 
A.2d at 55. In so surmising, the court 
determined that the resulting 
prejudice of admitting evidence of a 
defendant's advisement of Miranda 
rights at trial, when the defendant 
gave no subsequent statement, 
outweighed any probative value such 
testimony could offer. Id at 330,722 
A.2d at 60. Notwithstanding this 
conclusion, the court found it helpful 
to address the constitutional question 
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in order to clarify the circumstances 
under which the trial court may admit 
testimony of a defendant's post-arrest 
silence for the purpose of 
impeachment. Id. at 324-30, 722 
A.2d at 57-59. 
The court considered the general 
rule that the State may not violate a 
defendant's right to due process by 
introducing evidence of a defendant's 
post-arrest silence for the purpose of 
impeachment, based on the inherent 
unfairness presented in penalizing an 
individual for invoking a guaranteed 
right. Id. at 324, 722 A.2d at 57 
(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(l976)). The court reviewed past 
cases in which Doyle violations were 
found in order to assess the 
appropriate circumstances for 
allowing such testimony. Id. at 324-
30, 722 A.2d at 57-59. In the instant 
case, Dupree posited that the 
prosecution's mere mention that the 
defendant was advised of his Miranda 
rights, where no subsequent statement 
was made, was a violation of the 
Doyle rule. Id. at 325, 722 A.2d at 
57. 
Courts in the past have held that 
testimony that the police read the 
Miranda rights to a defendant upon 
arrest may be admitted to establish the 
voluntariness of the defendant's 
statement given thereafter. Id. at 325-
26, 722 A.2d at 57 (citing United 
States v. De La Luz Gal/egos, 738 
F.2d 378, 381-82 (lOth Cir. 1984)). 
In cases where the defendant made 
no subsequent statement, however, 
the prosecution may not use testimony 
to that effect to impeach the 
defendant. Id. at 330, 722 A.2d at 
60. Such testimony, according to the 
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court, allows the jury to improperly 
inferthedefendant'sguilt. Id at331, 
722 A.2d at 60 (citing Zemo v. State, 
101 Md. App. 303,646 A.2d 1050 
(1994)). This rule, in line with Doy/e, 
serves to protect a defendant's right 
to remain silent without fear that the 
silence will be used against the 
defendant at trial. Id. at 330, 722 
A.2d at 59. 
Finally, the court addressed the 
issue of whether this error was hann:ful 
to the extent that a reversal was 
warranted. Id. at 332-33, 722 A.2d 
at 61-62. The standard of review 
employed by the court in detennining 
whether the error was harmless was 
whether the evidence bore on the 
ultimate verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 332, 722 A.2d at 61. 
The court found that, because Dupree 
was asserting a case of self-defense, 
the prosecution's use of his silence 
was a deliberate attempt to undermine 
his credibility. Id. at 333,722 A.2d 
at 61. Because Dupree's credibility 
was critical to his defense, the court 
ruled that the error committed was 
clearly harmful. Id 
In Dupree v. State, the court 
ruled that the risk of prejudice that 
would result from the admission of 
such evidence posed an impermissible 
harm to a defendant's right to due 
process. By so holding, the court 
preserved the defendant's right to 
remain silent without fear that the 
prosecution could use this silence to 
circumvent their heavy burden of 
proof This ruling effectively prevents 
the jury from basing their detennination 
of guilt or innocence on extraneous 
inferences of guilt and shifts the proper 
focus to the merits of the case. 
THE CAREER SERVICES CENTER 
would like to assist you with 
ALL YOUR PROFESSIONAL STAFFING NEEDS 






To list a position, or for more information, please contact 
Karen Rae Hammer 
Assistant Dean 
at 
THE UNIVERSITY OF HAL TIM ORE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
1420 North Charles Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 2120 1 
(410) 837-4404 
19.1 U. Bait. L.F. 57 
